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Leasing, Inc., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The
court then ordered the forfeiture of the
Beechcraft to the United States.
Both Total Time and Sundance appealed
the forfeirure by protesting that they were
improperly denied a jury trial, that airplanes do not constitute forfeirure propeny
and that there was insufficient evidence to
allow the forfeiture.
The court of appeals concluded that Total Time and Sundance, despite making
timely requests for a trial by jury in their
answers to the complaint, waived this right
by failing to object to the district court's
decision to try the case without a jury. Both
defendants "vigorously participated" in the
trial without mentioning their earlier request for a jury uial. Id. at 951. The court
relied on its ruling in Milner tI. Norfolk &
WeslernRailwayCo., 643F.2d 1005(1981),
which, according to the court, stood for the
proposition that basic equitable principles
did not "mandate a jury trial if the plaintiff
was on notice that the uial court was planning to adjudicate the dispositive issues of
fact in the case and did not object." U.s. tI.
1966 Beechcrafc, 777 F.2d at 951, citing
Miller, 643 F.2d at 10 11, n.l. Since Total
Time and Sundance were aware of the
court's plan, to allow the defendants to request a jury and then "ambush the trial
judge" on appeal would be unfair. 777 F.2d
at 951, citing Palmer v. United States, 652
F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981).
Total Time next asserted that as an "innocent owner" it was exempt from the
"broad sweep" of the forfeiture statutes.
In Calero, the Supreme Court determined
that an owner would not be subject to the
forfeirure statutes wbere it was shown the
owner was "not only uninvolved in and
unaware of any wrongful activity, but that
he had done all that could reasonably be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of
his property." 777 F.2d at 951. Seeright's
behavior in the ca e at bar was determined
to be unbusinesslike as well as unwise, particularly in an area "such as outh Florida
where drug trafficking through the use of
private aircraft flouri hes." The "conscious
indifference" on the part of eeright established that Total Time failed to do "all that
it reasonably could to avoid having it property put to unlawful u e." 777 F.2d at 952.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the district court did not err in determining that Total Time wa not an innocent owner.
The £inal argument on appeal involved
the sufficiency ofevidence produced at the
uial by the government to support the forfeiture order. Based on the te timony of
Montgomery that the Beecbcraft carried coconspirators Gerant and Coddington, as
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well as the cocaine, the court upheld the forfeiture of the Beechcraft. The Government
argued that the Aerostar, while not involved
in carrying cocaine, facilitated the drug
conspiracy by transporting two of the conspirator to the site of the deal and, therefore, it was forfeitable under the tatute.
The circuits are divided over whether
21 U.S.C. S881(aX4}, which subjects to
forfeiture "all conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or ves els to transport, or in
any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession or concealment" of
controlled substances, may reach aircraft
only carrying the con pirators to the transaction site. The First, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have held that §881(aX4) Jays
down a per se forfeiture of certain items of
contraband but not of vehicle used in the
mere transportation of suspected conspirators. However, the Second, Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have resolved that forfeiture is proper when a vehicle only transports the drug dealer to the exchange site.
In aligning it elf with the laner viewpoint, the court looked (0 the legislative
history of the statute, which directed that
the intent of the provision was to allow forfeiture of property "only if there is a substantial connection between the property
and the underlying criminal activity." 777
F.2d at 952. The Fourth Circuit concluded
that transporting conspirators to an exchange site establishes a C sub (anrial connection between the conveyance and the
criminal activity sufficient to justify an order of forfeiture." 777 F.2d at 953. It was
further noted that the private airplane has
become an important tool to drug traffickers, particularly by allowing for quick arrivals and departures, and makes their apprehension all the more difficult.
The court's decision regarding the waiver
of a jury trial shows a total di regard for
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule
38(d) states that after a proper request for a
trial by jury has been made, all the parties
involved must con ent before it can be withdrawn. Furthermore, Rule 39(aXl) stipulates that a withdrawal must be in writing or
by verbal consent in open court and entered
in the record. Some court hold that these
rules are to be held in strict compliance and
any waiver cannot occur unless within the
precise terms of the rules. Palmer, 652 F.2d
at 896. While some court hold that the e
rule are not to be tTictIy construed, see
e.g., Bass 'V. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209
(5th Cir. 1949) cere. denied, 388 U.S. 816
(1949), these courts, including the Fourth
Circuit, seem to be ignoring the spirit of
the rules. A right to a jury trial "occupies
so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the

right to jury trial should be scrutinized
with (he utmost care." Dimick v. Schiedt,
293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934).
How far the Fourth Circuit is willing to
go to enforce 28 U.S.C. §881 remains to
be seen. For now, owners of private vehicles need to establish step [0 ensure their
property is not being used for illegal purposes or else risk being subject to forfeiture.
A lack of knowledge of the criminal activity is not sufficient under this recent decision. In addition, allowing ones property
to be used only by the conspirators of
crimes clearly jeopardizes that property.

- Patricia A. Grace
Trimper 'V. Porter-Hayden:
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN ASBESTO -RELATED
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
In an attempt to deal with the unique
character of asbesto -related deaths and its
effect on wrongful death and urvival actions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in
Trimper tI. PortfJr-Haydm, 305 Md. 31,
501 A.2d 446 (1985), held that wrongful
death actions for a be tos-related deaths
accrue either upon the discovery of me link
between death and exposure to asbestos or
upon the date of death whichever occurs
first.
In Trimper two widows, Charlotte M.
Trimper and Sylvia Sandberg, rued separate actions under the survival statutes for
the wrongful deaths of their respective
husbands alleging that the deaths of their
husbands resulted from their exposure to
asbesto and a best os dust. Both women
ftled their claim within three years from
the discovery of the connection between
asbestos exposure and the deaths of tbeir
husbands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore
City dismissed both actions finding that
the claims were time barred and each
widow appealed to the court of special appeals where the cases were consolidated.
Writ of Certiorari was i sued by the court
of appeals before the court of pedal appeals had the opportunity to consider the
matter. The que lion before the court was
whether wrongful death and survival actions for asbe to -related deaths are time
barred when instituted more than three
years after death or whether a discovery
rule applies. The court considered the
wrongful death claims apart from the survival claims a they are dealt with in separate statutes.
MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§3-904(g) (1984) deals with wrongful death
and provides that an action for wrongful

death shall be brought within three years
after the death of the injured person.
The appellants argued that where the
decedent died not knowing that he was a
victim of a wrong and that the wrong had
caused his demise, the beneficiaries should
have up to three years from the time they
knew or should have known the cause of
death, within which to bring an action for
wrongful death. Just such a discovery rule
was established in Harig v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299
(1978), a latent disease case.
The Trimper court distinguished the
Harig case from Trimper, as the former
was brought under MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §5-l0l (1984)
which is the general statute oflimitations
and which provides that an action shall be
filed within three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action. The court in
Harig defined "accrual" as when a plaintiff, "ascertains or through the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence should have
ascertained the nature and cause of his injury." 284 Md. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306.
The court's definition of accrual was restricted to latent disease cases.
The Trimper court contended that precedent precluded the court from applying a
discovery rule to wrongful death actions.
The rule in Maryland is, that since
the wrongful death statute created a
new liability not existing at common
law, compliance with the period of
limitations for such actions is a condition precedent to the right to maintain
the action. The period oflimitations is
part of the substantive right of action.
305 Md. at 35, citing State v. Zitomer, 275
Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976), citing
Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 266
Md. 52, 55-56, 291 A.2d 452, 454 (1972);
Dunnigan v. Coburn, 171 Md. 23, 25-26,
187 A. 881, 884 (1936); and State v. Parks,
148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793, 795
(1925).
The legislative intent behind the creation of the wrongful death statute is absolutely clear and "there is no room for judicial interpretation." Trimper, 305 Md.
at 36.
Conversely, the survival statutes do not
create a new cause of action unknown to
common law, but merely alter the common law under which certain actions may
be brought on behalf of decedents. The
statute provides that a cause of action at
law, except slander, survives the death of
either party. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §6-401(a) (1984). Limitations on survival actions are provided by
the general statute of limitations.

Appellants, as personal representatives,
relying on Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md.
631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), which established discovery as the general test for accrual, argued to the court that the survival
claims did not accrue until each woman
knew or should have known of the condition between her husband's exposure to asbestos and the resulting diseases suffered
by the decedents.
In response to this argument, appellees
argued that if no cause of action accrued
until it was discovered after the decedents'
respective deaths, then the decedents had
no cause of action at the time of death and
therefore no action may be brought on behalf of the decedents under the survival
statutes.
The court distinguished Poffenberger
from the case at bar in that the former
never dealt with an injured person who
subsequently died either from the injury
complained of or from other causes without having instituted a right of action for
the injury. Rather, Poffenberger focused
upon the injured person who discovered
the wrong inflicted upon him while living
but after the prescribed three years had expired.
The court also rejected appellees' argument that appellants' claims necessarily fail
if a discovery rule is applied. An injured
party need not know that he has suffered
a legally recognized wrong which has resulted in harm in order to have a complete
cause of action. The court further contended that the discovery rule limits the
period of time in which an injured plaintiff
may bring an action for the wrong committed, "but it does not change the time when
a cause of action becomes conceptually
complete." Trimper, 305 Md. at 42. Accordingly, the court held that the decedents
in these cases have a cause of action which
survive their deaths. The court then turned
to the question of how long the causes of
action exist.
Upon considering a series of case law
dealing with statutory time bars to wrongful death and survival actions, from which
no general principle regarding the same
could be drawn, the court held that survival actions must be brought within three
years of the discovery of a link between the
fatal disease and the exposure to asbestos.
The court explicitly limited the application
of the Qiscovery rule in survival actions to
latent disease cases which are instituted
initially as survival actions rather than
wrongful death actions. The court supported its decision by referring to the
workers compensation statute dealing specifically with latent occupational diseases.
The statute contains a provision whereby
an action for disability or death from pul-

monary dust disease must be brought
within three years from the date of disablement or death or the date on which the employee or his dependent discovered the link
between the disablement or death and his
employment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101,
§26(a)(4) (1985).
Thus considering the legislative intent
of the wrongful death statute, the discovery
rule established in Harig, and the workers
compensation statute, the Trimper court
concluded that in situations involving the
latent development of disease, a cause of
action accrues either when a person discovers or reasonably should have discovered
the nature and cause of the injury, or at
death whichever first occurs. Judgments
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
were affirmed.

- Patricia Dart Brooks
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v.lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: THE
DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC USE
DOCTRINE
In 1982, California acknowledged a sovereign's latent power to condemn a professional sports franchise through eminent domain. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
32 Cal. 3d 60,183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d
835 (1982). Recently in Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Indianapolis Colts,
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D.Md. 1985), the
City of Baltimore sought to test this power
in an attempt to enjoin the Colts football
franchise from relocating to Indianapolis.
Prompted by ailing negotiations between
the City and Colt's owner Robert Irsay,
the Maryland Senate on March 27, 1984
passed emergency legislation authorizing
the City of Baltimore to condemn the Colt's
NFL franchise. In response, Mr. Irsay immediately began shipping all of the team's
physical possessions to Indianapolis. Crews
worked throughout the night of March 28,
and by early morning the loaded Mayflower vans had left Maryland.
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland Legislature finalized Emergency Bill No. 1042,
1984 Md. Laws Ch. 6. Emergency Ordinance No. 32 was thereafter enacted by the
city authorizing the condemnation ofsport
franchises. A condemnation petition was
immediately filed in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City seeking to acquire the Colts
by eminent domain. On April 2, 1984 the
Colts removed the case to the federal district
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
The law of eminent domain authorizes a
sovereign to take property for public use
without the owner's consent upon making
just compensation. Nichol's on Eminent
Domain (3rd ed. 1980) §1.l1 pp. 1-10.
The majority of the case law defining the
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